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MARTIN KITCHEN: A MILITARY HISTORY
OF GERMANY: From the Eighteenth Century
to the Present day.
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975, pp. 384.
The central role of the army in the historical
development of Germany has long been wor-
ried-at by historians and has formed the sub-
ject of a number of specialised studies. Yet
since the publicaton of Gordon A. Craig's
The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1915
(1955) and Karl Demeter's The German Of-
ficer Corps in Society and State 1640-1935
(1965), there has been no attempt to syn-
thesize the findings of these monographs in-
to a book capable of appealing to the general
reader until the publication of A MiM:ary His-
tory of Germany.
Martin Kitchen's basic theme is that the army
in Germany has played a crucial role in main-
taining an anachronistic social order and in
impending social change. 'Social Change', a
concept demandng critical scrutiny, is taken
as read by Kitchen as meaning the establish-
ment of some form of socialist state.
We are presented with interesting insights
into an army having a profound impact on
German society, yet isolated from that so-
ciety by virtue of its highly stratified social
structure, its peculiaristic code of honour, its
stress on organic unity and intensive dis-
cipline as apposed to individualism and its an-
tipathy towards the Social Democratic move-
ment. The Prusso-German army, Kitchen con-
tends, engendered political instability by being
ill-attuned to the realities of the day.
Kitchen underlines the oft-fatal determination
of the officer-aristocrats to resist change even
when it had become a political and military
necessity. For instance, the Schlieffen plan
of 1905 was
, ... an inflexible and essentially unrealis-
tic strategic concept which had a disas-
trous effect on German diplomacy . . .
Fearing that the officer corps might become
dangerous liberal and that the men would
be social democrats and that the army
would thus no longer be reliable as an in-
strument of domestic oppression, the army
rejected the general staffs request for
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large increases. As a result the army did
not have the men it needed if its strategic
plan was to have a reasonable chance of
success.'
But was the Schlieffen plan 'essentially un-
realistic'? It so nearly worked. Were it not
for the tenacious defence of the BEF at Mons
the Germans could well have overrun France.
A number of Kitchen's statements are insuf-
ficiently substantiated. With respect to the
extract above the reader is left in the dark as
to the nature of the dichotomy between the
army command and the general staff. In dis-
cussin£1 the mobilization of the Prussian army
immediately prior to the humiliation of Olmutz
he remarks that 'there is evidence that the
mobilization was deliberately retarded and
sabotaqed by the officers who were strongly
opposed to the idea of a war which seemed
to be as much for liberalism as for Prussian
hegemony.' What this evidence is he does
not say. The regrettable omission of foot-
notes in the book reinforces the impression
of an unsystematic and undocumented ap-
proach. And this is unfortunate, for Mr
Kitchen's earlier and more specialized work,
The Gl~rman Officer Corps 1890-1914 (1968),
shows that he is well acquainted with un-
published material.
The author is too indiscriminate in his con-
demnation of the German military system and
its members. Why did the Prusso-German
army with its socially-exclusive officer corps
enjoy such military successes and serve as
a model for other armies? Despite their pri-
vileged position the German officer corps
were not necessarily indifferent to the need
for reform. There is a danger of compart-
mentalizing a particular class however rigid
and uniform their outlook might appear. There
is a distinction between a reactionary and a
conservative.
Although Kitchen aims to demonstrate how
the military history of Germany illuminates
'the changing nature of militarism under dif-
ferent forms of social organization: under de-
clining fet..dalism, under industrialization, un-
der parliamentary democracy, under facism
and under advanced capitalism', he never
really explores the complexity of the pheno-
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menon of militarism. Militarism cannot mere-
ly be identified with military personnel; civi-
lian militarists such as O'Annunzio, Barres,
Theodore Roosevelt and Treitschke have pro-
claimed the virtues of war.
Moreover, there are no meaningful compari-
sons to armies in other societies and coun-
tries. Max Weber's thesis that external pres-
sure has a vital determining influence upon
the evolution of a state's socio-political struc-
ture, also has relevance. It can be argued
that Prussia's history illustrates that armies
become influential in countries which expe-
rience foreign pressure constantly.
Although the army was undoubtedly a key
factor in shaping the authoritarian Bismarck-
ian Reich, as Kitchen rightly declares, the in-
tellectual contribution was significant. The
deification of the national state by Hegel had
a profound effect on German thought in the
19th century and tended to have the effect of
elevating the state above morality, of facili-
tating an uncritical acceptance of Realpolitik.
By viewing Germany's bid for world power
in 1914 as an attempt by the ruling class to
ease social tension by means of an aggres-
sive foreign policy, the author is guilty of
oversimplification. German militarsm in the
Wilhelmine era must be viewed in a wider
context: British hostility to Tirpitz's naval
programme, the Moroccan crisis, the expan-
sive tendencies of other European powers
and so on.
Had Kitchen consulted works by Holger H.
Herwig and Joseph Steinberg on the navy
and its officer corps he might have benefited
from perceptive insights into another part of
the officer corps that he neglects entirely.
He concentrates solely on the army. The im-
portance of Admiral van Tirpitz's naval pro-
gramme in strengthening militaristic tenden-
cies at home and in Britan is ignored. Tirpitz
was an astute manipulator of public opinion
and his naval bills, in contrast to the army
bills, were passed by the German parliament
without great difficulty.
Wh ile the reviewer appreciates the difficulty
or compressing nearly 300 years of the mili-
tary history of Germany into a single readable
book some discussion of the Polish campaign
of 1830-31, Italy's role and the indemnity bill
in 1866, the Zabern affair, the post war tank
development and the North African campaign
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would have been welcomed. A brief analysis
of the army's role in Germany's colonial ven-
tures involving a study of the policies of men
like Freiherr von Rechenberg, the progessive-
Iy minded Governor of Tanganyika in the
years 1906-11, would have been interesting.
Tactics, and the analysis of battles to illu-
strate military development, are neglected.
For example, Ludendorff's spring offensive
of 1918, in which he discovered a 'way
through' the Western Front based on infil-
tration and junior leadership, is mentioned en
passant.
A Military History of Germany is so construc-
ted to present an explicit anti militarist thesis.
Yet despite the book's many shortcomings
and despite his didactism, the author demon-
strates that military history, when not of the
kings-and-battles brand, can be intellectually
stimulating.
- Richard J. Haines.
OORLOGSDAGBOEKIE VAN H. S. OOSTER-
HAGEN, JANUARIE-JUNIE 1902. Met inlei-
ding, teksversorging en aantekeninge deur C.
C. Eloff. Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Na-
vorsing, Pretoria, 1976. Met foto's, kaarte en
register, pp. 106. Prys: R3,35.
Sedert 1972 verrig die Instituut vir Geskiede-
nisnavorsing van die RGN, onder leiding van
dr C. M. Bakkes, uitstekende werk deur
waardevolle geskiedkundige bronnepublikasies
die lig te laat sien. Tot nou toe het 'n viertal
van hierdie publikasies verskyn wat, tot hede,
sowel militer-historiese as ander fasette van
die tydperk 1899-1902 in die Transvaalse ge-
skiedenis belig.
In al hierdie gevalle is enkelinge, soos H. C.
Bredell, P. J. du Toit, It-kol S. P. E. Trichard
(gewese kommandant van die Transvaalse
Staatsartillerie) en - in hierdie geval - Hen-
ri Sicco Oosterhagen (Almelo, Nederland, 8
Augustus 1871 - Middelburg, Transvaal, 18
April 1953) aan die woord. Elkeen van hulle
het die toenmalige oorlogsgebeure in ons land
op hul eie manier ondervind en op hul eie
wyse daarop gereageer. Vir elkeen van boge-
noemdes het die oorlog aanleiding tot 'n be-
paalde optrede gegee. Oaar was Ou Toit wat
na die vyand oorgeloop het en Oosterhagen
wat - ofskoon hy hier en daar sy beden-
kings gehad het - tot die einde in die veld
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